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INTRODUCTION
College student free speech cases, particularly as applied to student
online speech challenges, suffer from conflicting legal principles. This
paper highlights empirically noted problems in resolving disputes
between a college student’s free speech rights and a public college’s
authority to maintain order and campus safety. In Part I of this paper,
the authors present the established legal principles from two
foundational cases addressing issues of student speech in the
educational context. In Part II, the authors demonstrate how courts have
used PK12 education cases and public employment cases as sources that
address legal principles for college student speech cases—particularly
to resolve college students’ speech challenges with an online dimension.
In Part III, the authors conclude that existing legal principles, ones
largely derived from the PK12 education context, are insufficient to
analyze some types of student collegiate speech cases. This thesis is
supported when examining several cases involving college students,
especially cases dealing with college students’ online speech or
expression. In resolving the legal framework problem, the authors
suggest a modification of existing legal principles that accounts
sufficiently for characteristics specific to the collegiate learning space.1
PART I. FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES FROM FOUNDATIONAL
EDUCATION LAW CASES
Two Supreme Court cases dealing with secondary students, Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District2 and Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier,3 have played significant roles in shaping
the legal framework for how many courts handle public college
students’ speech claims.
Tinker is one of the foundational cases in analyzing student free
speech. Students in the Tinker case planned to wear black armbands as
a silent protest to the ongoing hostilities occurring in the Vietnam War.
In anticipation of the protest, the school principals in the Des Moines

1 This paper builds on an earlier piece that explores frameworks to examine college student
free speech cases. See Jeffrey C. Sun, Neal H. Hutchens & James D. Breslin, A (Virtual) Land of
Confusion with College Students’ Online Speech: Introducing the Curricular Nexus Test, 16 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 49 (2013).
2 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
3 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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School District banned armbands in the school.4 The Supreme Court
ruled that the policy prohibiting the armbands violated the students’ free
speech. The Court crafted a principle of school disruption as the
operative authority for schools to regulate student speech. That is,
school officials may regulate student speech when the questioned
speech reasonably leads school officials to forecast substantial
disruption of or material interference with school activities or if speech
encroaches upon the rights of others.5 Thus, this analysis relies on the
independence of the student’s speech from either school-sponsored
activities or based on some learning activity such as an internship.
While Tinker presented an issue of students’ independent speech
(i.e., not school sponsored speech), a subsequent case, Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, brought forward a challenge involving an
instructional environment in the context of a journalism class. In
Hazelwood, a public high school principal removed selected articles
from the student newspaper. As part of a journalism class, students
wrote articles for the school newspaper dealing with student pregnancy
and parental divorce to which the principal objected. Drawing a
distinction between the type of independent student speech at issue in
Tinker, the Court concluded that a school may place greater restrictions
on student speech when it involves school-sponsored expressive
activities.6
The Court rationalized that when expressive activities take place in
which “students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably
perceive [them] to bear the imprimatur of the school,” then these
activities reflect instructional components and are attributed to the
school curriculum.7 Today, this legal rule serves as a short-hand
heuristic for school administrators that they have authority over student
speech when it is school sponsored. In Hazelwood, the Court
established the rule that “educators do not offend the First Amendment
by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 8 While not
in complete agreement, multiple courts have extended the legal
standards announced in Hazelwood to collegiate settings.9

4
5
6
7
8
9

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 504 (1969).
Id. at 740.
Id. at 271–72.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 273.
See, e.g., Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating “Hazelwood provides a
workable standard for evaluating a university student's First Amendment claim stemming from
curricular speech.”); Heenan v. Rhodes, 757 F. Supp.2d 1229, 1237–38 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (noting
that “the law in Hazelwood has been adopted by other courts faced with the question of what
protections are due student expression that touches upon internal school matters of pedagogical
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PART II. FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES: NOT QUITE SUFFICIENT FOR COLLEGE
STUDENTS’ ONLINE EXPRESSIONS
Although Tinker and Hazelwood offer guidance on free speech
principles to follow, these cases present challenges in their application
for courts and college administrators when addressing the parameters of
institutional authority over college students’ speech, including for
online settings. We briefly discuss two difficulties emergent from the
case law in student speech.
A. Distinguishing Between the PK12 and
Postsecondary Environments
Courts, at times, struggle to apply the legal principles derived from
Tinker (i.e., independent student speech) and Hazelwood (i.e., schoolsponsored speech) in a manner that sufficiently comports with the
purposes of the college environment, which of course, is substantially
different from that at the PK12 level. While not an online student
speech case, Hosty v. Carter10 illustrates judicial troubles with applying
First Amendment principles from PK12 cases to higher education. In
Hosty, the Seventh Circuit for the U.S. Court of Appeals applied
Hazelwood, the high school newspaper case, to a dispute arising
between student leaders of a college newspaper at a state university and
administrators at the institution. When the college newspaper staff
refused to issue a requested retraction, a university administrator
intervened and asked the newspaper printer to proceed only after the
administrator had reviewed and approved issues of the paper.11 The
newspaper staff filed a First Amendment speech rights claim against the
public university.
In the initial case, a federal district court granted summary
judgment to all the defendants except one—the administrator who
sought prior approval of the newspaper printing. Then, on an
interlocutory appeal addressing the administrator’s denial of summary
judgment (i.e., Hosty I), the federal appellate court reviewed the First
Amendment claim indicating that Hazelwood did not provide the
appropriate legal framework for a college newspaper.12 However, such

and curricular concern”).
10 Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Hosty II”).
11 Id.
12 Id. at 949.
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an application of Hazelwood was clearly relied upon when the case was
appealed en banc (i.e., Hosty II). At that time, the full panel of the
Seventh Circuit adopted Hazelwood as the operative framework.13 The
en banc panel found the situation in Hazelwood involving a high school
student newspaper funded and operated by a public school as
indistinguishable from the Hosty case, which involved a college student
newspaper subsidized by a university.14 In light of that application in
Hosty II, a public college or university could restrict student speech
when an administrator or instructor’s justification is reasonably related
to a legitimate pedagogical purpose.15
Indeed, this application of Hazelwood stretches the authority of
college administrators and fails to recognize the maturity and
journalistic autonomy that college newspapers try to espouse. 16 The
importation of Hazelwood extends to student speech beyond college
student newspapers. For example, in Heenan v. Rhodes,17 a nursing
student was dismissed allegedly in retaliation for her critical comments
about the nursing program’s student evaluation and dismissal systems.18
After being dismissed, she sued for First and Fourteenth Amendment
violations. The court explained in its analysis that Hazelwood “has
been adopted by other courts faced with the question of what
protections are due student expression that touches upon internal school
matters of pedagogical and curricular concern.”19 Recently, Professors
Jeffrey Sun and Neal Hutchens along with James Breslin drew attention
to the concerns about the Heenan case.20 They write: “[T]he court [in
Heenan] appeared to suggest that even in relation to any of the student’s
speech taking place outside of an instructional context, the Hazelwood
standards should apply merely because the content of the speech
addressed pedagogical and curricular issues related to the nursing
program.”21 Simply put, it is possible, within some jurisdictions, to
have a very broad interpretation of the reach of college administrator
authority over student speech involving content that is only somewhat

13
14
15
16

412 F.3d 731.
Id.
Id.
Several states have responded to the Hosty II decision. For instance, California, Colorado,
Illinois, and Oregon have enacted legislation declaring student media as designated public
forums. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-120.1 (2014);
110 ILL. COMP STAT. 13/1, ET SEQ. (2014); ORE. REV. STAT. § 351.649 (2014).
17 757 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (M.D. Ala. 2010); 761 F. Supp.2d 1318 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (denying
motion to alter or amend judgment).
18 757 F. Supp. 2d at 1232–1235.
19 Id. at 1238. The court did issue an amended opinion to make clear that independent student
speech was protected, but the court in its opinion was clearly struggling with application of the
student speech legal principles to a college environment.
20 Sun, Hutchens & Breslin, supra note 1.
21 Id. at 69.
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related to the learning within an academic program. Given this
extension of administrative authority, the application of Hazelwood to
college student speech claims raises important questions and concerns.
B. Distinguishing Between the Workplace and Collegiate
Experiences
Compounding the complication arising from the importation of
PK12 education law principles to college settings, courts have also
drawn on other First Amendment related principles to apply to student
speech. Notably, when addressing questions of college students’ speech
rights within certain learning environments, courts have drawn on the
public employee speech line of cases for the operative framework. In
brief form, Garcetti v. Ceballos22 offered the holding that public
employees hold no protected speech rights over expressions made
pursuant to carrying out one’s official duties. That is, when a public
employer engages in speech pursuant to carrying out his or her official
duties, then such speech is ineligible for First Amendment protection.23
The Garcetti decision offered a new legal wrinkle to the public
employee speech claim standards. The case created a bright-line
regarding when public employee speech is eligible or ineligible for First
Amendment protection. Further, when speech takes place outside of the
realm of carrying out official duties, as revealed in cases such as
Pickering v. Board of Education,24 Connick v. Myers,25 and Lane v.
Franks,26 the analysis centers on whether the speech addressed a matter
of public concern. Even if addressing a public concern, a governmental
employer can still proffer justifications, such as the need for efficiency
in operation, for restricting employee speech made in a private capacity.
One of the early college student online speech cases illustrates the
application of the public employee framework. In Snyder v. Millersville
University,27 a college student in a teacher education program posted
critical comments about her school-aged students viewing her MySpace
page and her training placement including disparaging remarks about
the lead teacher who was supervising her. In addition, she posted a
22
23

547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court in Lane v. Franks clarified the Garcetti ruling to
emphasize that a court’s inquiry in public employee speech cases examines whether the speech at
issue falls ordinarily within the scope of the public employee’s duties. 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379–80
(2014). As the Lane court observed, some courts have extended Garcetti in error to include
speech that merely concerns the challenged public employee’s duties, which would, in practice,
unintentionally stifle expressions such as a public employee’s truthful testimony under oath. Id.
24 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
25 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
26 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014).
27 Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).
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photo of her with the caption “drunken pirate.”28 The student-teacher
had also discussed her MySpace page with students at the training
placement school. Because of those postings, as well as other
deficiencies, the school discontinued Snyder as a student-teacher. In
light of that decision, Snyder was unable to complete her requirements
for state certification as a teacher, and she could not obtain the degree in
education that she was pursuing. As a result, Snyder sued the university
for First Amendment speech violations and constitutional due process
claims.
In examining this case, the federal district court observed that
Snyder’s environment was more akin to an apprenticeship model than a
student-university model and such analysis was consistent in other
jurisdictions that have examined college students’ practice-based
learning. As such, the court determined that Snyder was performing
functions and duties more akin to an employee than a college student.
Looking to the public employee framework, the court determined that
the speech was personal in nature and not a matter of public concern.
Thus, the student-teacher could not sustain a First Amendment claim.
The Snyder case, as noted, represents another kind of importation of
legal standards to assess college student speech claims. Rather than
looking to PK12 settings, in cases involving student practica and
internships, courts have looked to the legal standards applicable in a
workplace setting. Similar to the cases that place overreliance on PK12
legal standards, the cases using the public employee legal standards to
analyze college students’ free speech rights, particularly in matters
involving students’ online speech, have not been tailored to the unique
circumstances and concerns of a higher education context. While the
PK12 framework cases reflect a heavy hand signaling oversight and
authority over students as children, the public employee framework
cases reflect little tolerance for actions in the workplace, instead treating
students as trained professionals, who have the knowledge and
experience required in an employment setting. Suffice it to say, neither
properly supports the middle ground appropriate to a collegiate setting.
PART III. PRESENTING A COLLEGIATE LEARNING SPACE INQUIRY
The collegiate learning space warrants a different analysis. As
noted earlier, the PK12 education speech cases and public employee
speech cases do not fully appreciate the context of higher education.
Past legal rules have offered some insight, but as a whole, they serve as
poor heuristic guides for college administrators. In a pending piece by

28

Id. at *5–*6.
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Neal Hutchens, Jeffrey Sun, Joy Blanchard, and James Breslin, these
academic scholars argue that courts should analyze speech cases of
college students in internships and practica without overreliance on
PK12 and public employee cases as the analytic framework.29
Professionalism standards of academic programs have also come to
light in several cases involving college students’ online speech.30
Collectively, these cases illustrate how courts have offered mixed
messages in terms of classifying students, and how case outcomes seem
disproportionate to, or not aligned with, a sound educational rationale.
Further, Jeffrey Sun, Neal Hutchens, and James Breslin recently
explained why legal principles generated from PK12 education law
cases fail to articulate the nuanced differences between schools and
colleges as learning places.31 In light of these two pieces, this paper
suggests a re-envisioning of the collegiate learning space with a more
narrowly defined set of justifications for college administrators to limit
student’s speech.
Indeed, courts and college administrators should more thoughtfully
and deliberately consider the nature of collegiate learning spaces which
both affect, and are affected by, the quality of the student speech that
they enable. Specifically, if college administrators wish to have greater
authority over student speech, universities must present a more carefully
articulated set of justifications in terms of how the student speech at
issue arises to the educational institution’s domain such as having a
legitimate curricular or pedagogical concern.
In the past, courts have accepted a mere showing of some
reasonable relationship between the student’s speech and the
educational environment. In those cases, that showing—without
more—would suffice for college authority to curb student speech. This
paper suggests that a more direct relationship be articulated. That is,
college officials should be required to present a far more direct
identification of the educational rationale and the college official’s
actions that would justify limiting a student’s speech.
This proposal modifies expectations of college administrators, so
they must demonstrate a direct connection. For example, cases
applying Hazelwood would not simply forward how the speech is
“reasonably related” to the pedagogical interest for the college to limit
it. Instead, college officials must demonstrate a “directly related”
application to the pedagogical interest in order to limit student speech.

29 Neal H. Hutchens, Jeffrey C. Sun, Joy Blanchard & James Breslin, Employee or student?
The First Amendment and student speech arising in practica and internships, 306 EDUC. L. REP.
597 (2014).
30 Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, 526 Fed.Appx. 537 (6th Cir. 2013); Tatro v. Univ. of
Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012).
31 Sun, Hutchens & Breslin, supra note 1, at 53–56.
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The higher standard would recognize colleges and universities as places
fostering dialogue and debate in a healthy manner. Equally important, it
would not summarily shield administrators with rights to quash these
opportunities of advancing the ideal that colleges and universities serve
as the marketplace of ideas.
CONCLUSION
The preceding sections present a bit of irony. In one line of cases,
courts applied PK12 education cases to the postsecondary educational
setting. These cases make the learning environment of the PK12
educational sector largely akin to the higher education sector.
Nonetheless, the literature and other cases are rich is discussion about
how the maturity levels of students vary between these sectors and the
differing educational missions of these contexts. Notably, these cases
recognize that colleges are key places in society to advance debate and
critical inquiry and foster open marketplaces of ideas in a way different
than the inculcative and custodial functions of the PK12 environment.
Even more interesting, the line of cases using the PK12 education
model to address postsecondary challenges is juxtaposed with the line
of cases that apply the public employee speech framework to
postsecondary student speech litigation. This second line of cases
represent a noticeable shift toward thinking about postsecondary
education in reference to the public workplace. Thus, the cases consider
college students as akin to working professionals. The contrast is stark,
yet neither is sufficient or fully appropriate. Accordingly, this paper
advances a more nuanced approach, which responds to the unique
nature of the collegiate learning space by requiring a more narrowly
defined set of justifications for when college administrators may limit
student’s speech.

